Most conversations about hiring start with the candidate. This one starts with what the open seat is actually costing you. It takes about two minutes, and there's a calculator below.
Every one of those applications has to be screened, reviewed, interviewed or turned down by somebody on your team. It costs the candidate almost nothing to apply, and these days an AI agent can fire off a resume to four hundred companies in an afternoon. Your team is the one who eats the cost, on every single one.
Your team is spending expensive hours filtering cheap applications. That's the real cost, and it's not even the expensive part yet.
The problem is what they force your organization to do. Volume arrives as work, and it gets more expensive the further down the funnel it travels. More applicants don't create more talent. They create more decisions.
Wrong stack, wrong level, wrong country. Costs you two minutes and a rejection. Now multiply it by several hundred.
Passes the filter, earns a screen, sometimes a full panel. Your engineers pay for this one in hours rather than minutes.
Qualified, impressive, and never going to join you. Costs a full loop, comp approval, and four weeks you don't get back.
Many of the people you would most want are not applying at all. They have to be recruited.
This isn't an argument that your talent team is doing something wrong. The cost of applying collapsed. The cost of filtering shifted to them.
The proportions move with the role, the level and the location. The shape holds. Your organization has to process the entire pile to reach the last two bands, and what is left is smaller, slower and more expensive than the headline count suggests. The four or five people you would most want are not in the pile at all.
Your facts on the left, our assumptions underneath. Change anything you disagree with; nothing is sent anywhere.
Screening hours are roles multiplied by applications multiplied by minutes, divided by sixty, costed at the recruiting rate. Interview hours are roles multiplied by loops multiplied by engineering hours per loop, costed at the engineering rate.
Offers per hire is one divided by one minus your decline rate. Days open is your base figure plus the extra offer cycles multiplied by the days a decline adds. The base is deliberately defined as time to fill when the first offer is accepted, so the decline penalty is never already baked in.
Vacancy cost is roles multiplied by days open multiplied by the daily cost, and it is off by default because most teams cannot defend a number for it. The result stands without it.
$83,380 is absorbable. Most companies your size already absorb it, inside a budget nobody audits by the hour. 17 workweeks is finite capacity you don't get back, and that is where those hours came from.
What didn't get done while your best people were hiring people you didn't hire?
You didn't budget for this. It accumulated one résumé, one screen, one interview panel and one declined offer at a time.
The recruiting hours are the smaller number. The larger one is what this person was hired to accomplish and hasn't.
What was this person supposed to accomplish?
There isn't a good answer here. That is the point of the question.
Two jobs now, and one isn't the job they were hired for. Also the person most able to leave.
You're solving execution problems instead of leading the organization. Your calendar shows it.
Everyone is more fragmented, nothing has a clear owner, and velocity drops with no single visible cause.
Then the work simply didn't happen, and the plan quietly changed without anyone deciding to change it.
Your competitors are still hiring, shipping and iterating. The vacancy is only half the story. The other half is what happened across the market while it stayed open.
Execution compounds. So does delay. Your competitor doesn't just ship first, they learn first, and the next decision they make is better informed than yours. The market doesn't care why you couldn't hire them. It only sees what your competitor shipped while you were looking.
Work redistributes to the strongest people. Their load rises. Focus fragments. Burnout risk grows. Eventually the hiring problem becomes a retention problem.
One vacancy can create the next.
Your team didn't lose an offer. They lost the last four weeks.
We don't start closing when the offer arrives.
By offer stage there should be very few surprises. Not none; anyone promising certainty is overselling. Very few.
More filters. More recruiter headcount. More engineer interview time. Another ninety-day vacancy. Another late decline. Another roadmap push.
We don't sell a better filter. We change what enters the funnel. We create an additional precision pipeline alongside the team already doing the work.
You stop treating your ATS and your LinkedIn results as the whole market. LinkedIn is useful. It just isn't the market. Most searches lean on applicants, résumé databases and the obvious profiles. We don't just search harder. We search a larger talent surface.
Filings and named inventors expose the engineers actually creating technology in a field, not the people whose résumés contain the right words.
Maintainers and contributors in the ecosystems that matter to your stack. One source among several; plenty of excellent engineers work behind closed source.
Published work, conference programs, standards bodies and technical communities reveal who is working at the frontier of a discipline.
Experience structured across skills, companies, projects and adjacent work, so the right person surfaces even when a keyword search never would.
We identify people by evidence of what they've built, not simply what a résumé claims. That matters more now because AI can rewrite a résumé in seconds. It cannot retroactively create the product someone shipped, the patent they filed or the research they published.
The objective isn't a bigger candidate pool. It's a better starting point.
The data expands the market we can see. The recruiter still has to earn the conversation. Discovery is technology-assisted. Headhunting is still human: someone experienced has to get the person to engage, qualify them, and close them.
This is why the model produces fewer submissions. We spend more effort deciding who deserves to enter your process, so your team spends less deciding who should leave it. Your hiring team should be making fewer decisions, not more.
Traditional search depends heavily on exact titles and keywords. We structure professional experience across roles, skills, technologies, companies, projects and career patterns, then use semantic retrieval and model-based ranking to identify adjacent and non-obvious matches: matching by meaning rather than by literal string. The public evidence sources above (filings, code, research, communities) are joined to that structure so a search can start from what someone has demonstrably done.
None of it replaces the conversation. It decides who is worth having one with.
Trailing figures across senior technical search. Historical results, not a forecast for your role.
Submittal-to-offer ratio. The evaluation is done before you meet them.
Offer acceptance, frequently above 90%. Prepared candidates convert.
Built an engineering organization from zero, including six executive searches.
Fair questions. Here are our answers.
Good. We work best alongside strong internal teams.
This isn't us versus them. On difficult searches, we create a parallel pipeline that gives the hiring team another view of the market.
One of two things happens.
Your internal team is already surfacing the strongest available talent, and our work confirms it.
Or we introduce people your existing process did not reach.
Both outcomes are useful.
Your internal team stays at the center of the hiring operation. We become additional search capacity when specialization, bandwidth, urgency or access to a difficult talent market becomes the constraint.
Think of it as compare and contrast, not replacement.
Then you probably don't need another firm doing the same thing.
The question isn't how many recruiters are working on the search. The question is whether each one is expanding the talent market you can see—or simply producing more names from the same visible pool.
We would rather take responsibility for one difficult search than become the fourth firm generating activity across five.
Give us the role that is still open despite the existing coverage.
If our shortlist looks exactly like everyone else's, you have your answer.
If it doesn't, you just expanded the market.
There is usually a reason for that policy.
Maybe a previous firm charged a significant fee and produced mediocre results. Maybe hiring managers were overwhelmed with resumes. Maybe outside recruiters created more work than they removed.
Those are reasonable reasons to be skeptical.
We're not asking you to change your entire recruiting model.
We're asking you to test the assumption on one difficult role.
On a contingency search, there is no search fee unless you hire someone we introduce. Compare our pipeline against what you already have.
If we don't improve the market you can see, don't continue.
If we introduce the person you ultimately hire, the exception answered the question.
Because the fee isn't the real comparison.
The comparison is the fee versus another 30, 60 or 90 days of an empty seat.
Another month of engineering interviews.
Another finalist who declines.
Another roadmap item that moves right.
More work absorbed by the people already carrying it.
And another month in which your competitors continue hiring, shipping, learning and iterating.
If your internal team can produce the right hire faster, use them.
But if a specialized search partner changes the outcome, measure the fee against the cost of leaving the problem unresolved—not against zero.
The cheapest recruiting process is not always the one with the lowest fee.
It's the one that gets the right person productive fastest with the least organizational waste.
Sometimes.
LinkedIn is useful. It just isn't the entire talent market.
We start with the companies, teams and environments where the capability actually lives. Then, where relevant, we expand the evidence surface through patents, open-source contribution, published research, conference participation, technical communities, professional history and adjacent career patterns.
The objective isn't to find obscure candidates simply so our list looks different.
It is to answer a better question:
Who has actually done this work—whether or not they used the keywords we searched for, appeared in the obvious search results, or ever applied to the job?
Then we recruit those people directly.
That broader search philosophy is already supported by Verticalmove's sourcing model, which uses market mapping and multiple evidence sources rather than relying on a single database or search interface.
We don't know with certainty.
Anyone who tells you they do is overselling.
But an offer decline should rarely reveal something nobody knew.
Before we introduce someone, we are already trying to understand why they would move, what they want next, compensation expectations, company stage, location, competing opportunities and the criteria that will ultimately determine their decision.
And that conversation continues throughout the interview process.
We don't start closing the candidate when the offer arrives.
By the time you are ready to make one, we should understand what they are likely to do, why they are likely to do it, and what could still change the outcome.
The goal isn't certainty.
It's very few surprises.
Then finding that out quickly is valuable.
A serious search should occasionally tell you that the specification is wrong.
Maybe the compensation doesn't support the level.
Maybe the geography removes too much of the market.
Maybe the role combines two jobs that rarely exist in one person.
Maybe the experience requirements eliminate people who could actually deliver the outcome.
Or maybe the talent pool is simply much smaller than expected.
If that is what the market tells us, we'll show you the evidence and help you decide which variable to change.
Discovering that the role is unfillable as written in week two is useful. Discovering it in month nine is expensive.
A successful search does not always begin by proving the job description right.
Sometimes it begins by proving what the market will actually support.
One difficult role.
Compare what we produce against what you already have.
Then decide whether the difference is worth continuing.